President Trump has once again threatened the countries that have sent troops to Greenland, including the UK, with a 10% tariff on products exported to the US: another attempt to use trade as a lever to force advancement of his radical and controversial international agenda.
If he follows through with his threat, the immediate effect on UK food exports to the US would be higher landed prices, greater uncertainty for importers, and a shift in what Americans buy from Britain rather than a sudden collapse in trade.
The US is already an important (and growing) destination for UK food and drink. The Food and Drink Federation reported UK food and drink exports to the US rising to about £1.4bn in the first half of 2025.1 A broad tariff would not hit every product equally: premium, strongly-branded items can sometimes absorb price rises better than commodity-style goods, but the pain is still real because the US buyer pays the duty at the border and will try to claw that cost back through lower purchase prices, reduced volumes, or switching suppliers.
For iconic UK exports such as Scotch whisky and premium spirits, a 10% tariff is unlikely to kill demand outright, but it would squeeze margins and could slow growth. US distributors might respond by trimming ranges, leaning into promotions less often, and favouring larger suppliers with the scale to fund marketing or offer rebates. Smaller UK producers, including craft gin distillers, artisan food brands and niche confectionery exporters, tend to have less in the way of negotiating power and less cash to bridge a sudden cost shock, making them more vulnerable.
For more price-sensitive categories, including processed foods, biscuits, certain dairy and ambient groceries, a 10% tariff can be enough to push consumers towards US-made substitutes or imports from countries not facing the same penalty. Even where “Made in UK” carries a premium, supermarkets and foodservice buyers often work to fixed cost targets; tariffs become a reason to renegotiate contracts or shorten commitments. Over time, that can reduce investment in US-facing capacity in the UK, because firms cannot be sure that market access will remain stable.
There’s also a second-order effect: tariffs rarely arrive alone. Once trade relations sour, friction tends to spread into customs processes, compliance checks, and regulatory cooperation. Paperwork delays, more intensive inspections, or shifting interpretations of standards can be just as commercially damaging as the tariff itself, especially for chilled or time-sensitive products. Businesses then carry more inventory, pay more for warehousing and take fewer risks on new product launches.
Finally, even if Keir Starmer's government chooses not to retaliate - and UK ministers have publicly played down the idea of tit-for-tat - the mere prospect of an escalating dispute can change behaviour.2 US buyers may diversify away from UK suppliers to reduce risk in their supply chains, while UK exporters may divert effort to faster-growing non-US markets. In that sense, the biggest consequence of a Greenland-linked tariff might be strategic: it would remind firms that access to the US market can be used as leverage in unrelated geopolitical arguments, and that “policy risk” now needs to be priced into food export plans, contracts, and investment decisions.3
- 1
https://www.fdf.org.uk/fdf/resources/publications/trade-reports/trade-snapshot-h1-2025
- 2
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/uks-reeves-says-confident-uk-us-economic-deal-will-hold-2026-01-21
- 3
https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/01/trumps-greenland-tariffs-show-uk-must-prepare-new-era-economic-coercion
